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From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

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This malware came in a phishing e-mail disguised as a Bitcoin wallet. After clicking the link, user receives a JAR file (hosted at Dropbox): wallet.aes.json.jar, that turns out to be a RAT Adwind.


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT
From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Dropbox link (currently not active): https://www.dropbox.com/s/sl8ton6reobdyb7/wallet.aes.json.zip?dl=1

Analyzed sample 851bc674d181910870fbba24763d5348 the dropped sample ( wallet.aes.json.jar ) 2eb123e43971eb2eaf437eaeffeeed8e stage 2 24840e382da8d1709647ee18e33b63f9 stage 3 (core JAR) DLLs shipped in the JAR: 0ad1fc3ddb524c21c9b31cbe3fd57780 key\amd64.dll 0b7b52302c8c5df59d960dd97e3abdaf key\x86.dll 9e0b34a35296b264d4b0739da3b63387 protector\amd64.dll c17b03d5a1f0dc6581344fd3d67d7be1 protector\x86.dll

Files dropped during analysis:

7f97f5f336944d427c03cc730c636b8f .reg

0b7b52302c8c5df59d960dd97e3abdaf DLL

Behavioral analysis

After being deployed, the malware runs silently. If we observe it via Process Explorer, we can spot it deploying some scripts.


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Indeed, during the installation some new files are being dropped into the %TEMP% folder: vbs scripts, reg file for the registry modification, and a DLL.


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

The vbs scripts are used to detect installed security products (AV, firewall) and they are deleted immediately after being deployed. Example of the captured script:

Set oWMI = GetObject("winmgmts:{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\.\root\SecurityCenter2")
Set colItems = oWMI.ExecQuery("Select * from FirewallProduct")
For Each objItem in colItems
With objItem
WScript.Echo "{""FIREWALL"":""" & .displayName & """}"
End With
Next

The application installs itself as a hidden file in a hidden folder. After disabling the attribute we can see the jar, copied as windows.Windows :


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Persistence is achieved with the help of a registry key:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

The first visible symptom of infection is an attempt of running the reg file that triggers UAC popup. If we accept it, soon we can see another pop-up informing about UAC being disabled.

The malware establishes connection with the server: 104.239.166.119 ( jamoos88.ddns.net ):


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Fragment of the captured communication:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT
Unpacking

This malware comes solidly obfuscated. There are three jars nested in one another. Two inner JARs were encrypted using strong cryptography (RSA + AES). The last (third) layer is a core module the jRAT bot.

Stage 1

Trying to decompile the code (i.e. with the help of JD-GUI) we can notice that it is not readable. As we can find by reading strings, it has been obfuscated by Allatori Obfuscator v6.0 DEMO.

Fortunately, using this free java deobfuscator ( https://github.com/java-deobfuscator/deobfuscator ) it was possible to get some improvement. Example of the settings used:

java -jar deobfuscator-1.0.0.jar -input wallet.aes.json.jar \
-output deobfuscated.jar \
-transformer general.SyntheticBridgeTransformer \
-path /usr/lib/jvm/java-8-openjdk-amd64/jre/lib/rt.jar

However, even after preprocessing by the deobfuscator, the popular decompiler JD-GUI (and some other) were not able to give a valid output code. Finally, I managed to get a valid code with the help of CFR decompiler ( http://www.benf.org/other/cfr/ ). In order to unpack other files, like resources from inside of the jar, I changed it’s extension to zip and decompressed it.


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Manifest points, that execution of the code starts from the class MANAGER:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

In the main folder, we can see several other classes with obfuscated names. There are also 2 subfolders. Opening them leads to some encrypted files, as well as two identical JPEGs with the following content:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Although their content is curious (it is a photo of a document, probably a driving license) they are most likely added just as junk for the purpose of obfuscation.

The deobfuscated code still needed a lot of manual cleaning before it started getting a readable shape. Not only classes, but also all the strings are obfuscated.

After all, we could find out, that first some file is being decrypted. It’s path and the used key are stored in the class called i :

public final class i {
public static String b = c.a(f.a("\t'VdU:\t/\b;H,"));
public static String a = c.a(f.a("J U{\u0015$C'B @\"T$Q'"));
}

The same class after manual deobfuscation:

public final class i {
public static String key = "lks03oeldkfirowl";
public static String path = "/lp/sq/d.png";
}

Decryption involves a wrapper implemented in a class c .

byte []dec_content = c.a(input_data, key.getBytes());

After manual deobfuscation of this class, we can see that it deploys AES:

public static byte[] a(byte[] a2, byte[] a3) {
try {
Key key = new SecretKeySpec((byte[])a3, "AES");
Cipher cipher2 = Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/PKCS5Padding");
cipher2.init(2, key);
a2 = cipher2.doFinal(a2);
return a2;
}
catch (Exception v1) {
return null;
}
}

The result is an XML file:

https://gist.github.com/hasherezade/4997bae081a9d62305e33a6f97725c60#file-d-png-xml

The file has lot of junk fields, that are used only to make the content less readable. Only two fields are used further:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

First field SERVER refers to a resource path containing one more encrypted fie. Second field PASSWORD is an AES key.

Decryption involves two steps, executed by two classes. AES just like in the previous case and then Gzip decompression of the result.

byte []dec_content = b.a(c.a(input_data, key.getBytes()));

After applying it, we get another JAR stage 2.

See the full decryptor: https://gist.github.com/hasherezade/e08e9eb1e40a5822bb1f6b0abd9c76e6

Stage 2

Similarly, I cleaned the jar by the same deobfuscator. Then, I decompressed the jar to view resources.


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

The execution starts in a class JRat in the folder operational:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Even after cleaning by the automated deobfuscator, the code is still far from being readable. (You can see it here ).

Finally, after manual refactoring we can find out, that this is just another loader, meant to unpack next stage JAR and then to run it.

Deobfuscated decryptor class:

package w;
import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;
import java.security.Key;
import java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
public class kyl {
private byte[] encryptedAesKey;
private byte[] encryptedBuffer;
private static int mode = javax.crypto.Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE;
public kyl() { }
public void setEncryptedBuffer(byte[] value) {
this.encryptedBuffer = value;
}
public void setEncryptedAesKey(byte[] value) {
this.encryptedAesKey = value;
}
public byte[] decryptContent(Object object2) throws GeneralSecurityException {
Cipher object = Cipher.getInstance("RSA");
object.init(2, (RSAPrivateKey)object2);
Cipher cipher2 = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
byte []aesDecrypted = object.doFinal(this.encryptedAesKey);
SecretKeySpec sKey = new SecretKeySpec(aesDecrypted, "AES");
Cipher arrby = cipher2;
arrby.init(mode, (Key)sKey);
return arrby.doFinal(this.encryptedBuffer);
}
}

See the full decryptor: https://gist.github.com/hasherezade/fef5bd9b2b12d6bc384d40fc60213d05

Resources of the file contains RSA private key, encrypted AES key and the encrypted content. After deobfuscating the code, and applying them properly in order to decrypt the content, we can see one more XML file:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Each of the properties is a path leading to other resources:

SERVER_PATH points to the encrypted resource with yet another JAR (the core of the malware). PASSWORD_CRYPTED is an RSA encrypted AES key. PRIVATE_PASSWORD is a private RSA key. The same decrypting function (using RSA + AES) must be applied once again on the content read from the resource files, defined in the XML. As the result we get another (third) JAR.

Additionally, in the comment section we can see a link to the website of the JRAT tool.Following the link we can find a commercial description provided by the authors/resellers a tool intended for a non-malicious purpose of remote administration. At first it looks like we found a source related to this application but is it really? (More information about it you will find in the section “Identification”).

Stage 3 Deobfuscation decompiler choice makes a big difference

I used the same automated java deobfuscator to clean this stage and then tried to decompile the output jar.

Looking at the internal structure of the JAR we can find familiar elements that ensure us, that this is the core of this malware. For example, the functionality used to infect particular system (windows, mac, linux). In folders key and protect we can find the DLLs that are being dropped in %TEMP% folder on Windows. Also, there are classes responsible for network communication over SSL.

However, the success of the analysis depends very much on the decompilers that we use. Although JD-GUI was very good to present the internal structure of packages, it was not capable of decompiling all the classes. We can easily read the packages that were not obfuscated. But the core of the RAT classes in a package called server are completely unreadable:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

The other decompiler CFR gave a far better result. See the code: https://gist.github.com/hasherezade/4997bae081a9d62305e33a6f97725c60#file-layer3-java .

Finally we get some java code, but this is not the end of the deobfuscation. In order to make analysis harder, two techniques are applied. First of all, the classes and methods and variables are renamed to meaningless, similar looking strings. Second, all the strings are encrypted by several functions.They are decrypted at runtime, just before use. Most of the code in the core classes looks similar to this fragment:


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

Although sometimes we can see references to classes with readable names (like JSON parsers) it is too less to understand the functionality behind. Decoding some of the strings could improve readability a lot, but unfortunately, the responsible functions decompiled by CFR came out distorted. After several attempts I found a decompiler that managed to get them right Kraktau ( https://github.com/Storyyeller/Krakatau ). Example one of the string decrypting functions decompiled by Kraktau:

Additionally, those functions make a decryption key from the name of the calling class and method. Due to this fact, if we try to start deobfuscation process from renaming the functions, we cannot get the valid strings.

Decoding the configuration

In the folder resources we can find some interesting files: Key1.json , Key2.json and config.json .


From a fake wallet to a Java RAT

It was easy to guess, that they are encrypted by the same way as the previous layer: Key1 was a serialized RSA private key, Key2 -encrypted AES key, and config.json an AES encrypted configuration file. Indeed, deploying the decryptor I made in order to defeat the previous layer worked. We got a configuration of the RAT.

See the full file:

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